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Abstract Many studies of unconscious processing involve
comparing a performance measure (e.g., some assessment of
perception or memory) with an awareness measure (such as a
verbal report or a forced-choice response) taken either concur-
rently or separately. Unconscious processing is inferred when
above-chance performance is combined with null awareness.
Often, however, aggregate awareness is better than chance, and
data analysis therefore employs a form of extreme group anal-
ysis focusing post hoc on participants, trials, or items where
awareness is absent or at chance. The pitfalls of this analytic
approach are described with particular reference to recent re-
search on implicit learning and subliminal perception. Because
of regression to the mean, the approach can mislead researchers
into erroneous conclusions concerning unconscious influences
on behavior. Recommendations are made about future use of
post hoc selection in research on unconscious cognition.
Keywords Unconscious . Subliminal . Implicit . Regression
to themean . Error
Regression to the mean is as inevitable as death and
taxes.
—Campbell and Kenny (1999, p. ix)
The study of unconscious or implicit cognition has become
a central research topic within experimental psychology. It
includes its own specialist journals, such as Consciousness
& Cognition, has prompted the development of sophisticated
instruments, such as the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald,
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) for measuring unconscious pro-
cesses, and has been fundamental in the specification and
characterization of new neurological syndromes (e.g.,
blindsight; Weiskrantz, 1986). It has also fostered a range of
tailored research methods. This article explains and offers an
extensive critique of one such widely used method, based on a
form of extreme group analysis (Preacher, Rucker,
MacCallum, & Nicewander, 2005), for purportedly demon-
strating unconscious effects on behavior. In brief, this article
raises a major concern over a method that has been in use for
over a century and which continues to flourish today.
In general terms the vast majority of studies of unconscious
mental processing involve comparing a performance measure
(e.g., some assessment of perception or memory) with an
awareness measure (such as a verbal report or a forced-
choice response) taken either concurrently or separately. For
instance, ten Brinke, Stimson, and Carney (2014) presented
participants with videos of actors either telling the truth or
lying about a theft. Discrimination was at chance under con-
scious conditions: participants were unable explicitly
(directly) to judge which actors were lying and which were
telling the truth. In a performance (implicit, unconscious, in-
direct) test involving speeded responding, in contrast, partici-
pants reacted significantly faster following images of truthful
than of deceptive actors. Thus, ten Brinke et al. interpreted this
as evidence that deceptive cues from the actors can be detected
and “leak” into unconscious but not conscious decisions.
Henceforth, the terms performance or performance
measure will be used to refer to the target behavioral
(implicit) measure, often a facilitation in the speed or ac-
curacy of responding (priming). The terms awareness
measure and report will be used to refer to the assessment
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of conscious (explicit) knowledge. When parallel perfor-
mance and awareness measures are collected, one pattern
that might emerge is for performance to show some above-
chance sensitivity to a task variable and for the awareness
measure to show null sensitivity. In the experiment just
described, the performance test showed sensitivity to the
manipulated variable (truth/lie), but the awareness test did
not. Although the literature contains hundreds of results
fitting this description (such as that of ten Brinke et al.,
2014), there are rather fewer that have withstood indepen-
dent replication attempts (Newell & Shanks, 2014; Shanks
& St. John, 1994). Indeed the past half-century of research
on unconscious cognition, going back at least as far as the
classic debate between Greenspoon (1955) and Dulany
(1961), has been characterized by repeated cycles in which
new ways of demonstrating unconscious processes have
been challenged by later investigations. For example,
Vuilleumier, Schwartz, Duhoux, Dolan, and Driver
(2005) and Butler and Klein (2009) reported evidence of
pure implicit memory using rapid serial visual presentation
(RSVP). Line drawings of objects were superimposed
(e.g., a red umbrella and a green horse) and presented in
an RSVP stream, and participants were instructed to attend
to one of the colors. Their subsequent conscious
recognition for unattended items was found to be not
reliably better than chance, but these objects sustained a
repetition priming effect that the authors interpreted as an
unconscious process. Extensive efforts by Berry, Shanks,
Li, Rains, and Henson (2010) to replicate these findings
were unsuccessful, however.
Moreover, when performance shows some above-chance
sensitivity at the same time that a report measure shows null
sensitivity, there is often the concern that the absence of sta-
tistically significant evidence for awareness is (mis)interpreted
as evidence of absence (Reingold & Merikle, 1988; Schmidt
& Vorberg, 2006). For example, many researchers have re-
ported chance-level awareness in implicit learning studies
employing a contextual cuing task (the task is described in
more detail later). Vadillo, Konstantinidis, and Shanks
(2016) conducted a meta-analysis of 67 experiments, reported
with sufficient data to be analyzed. Although all these studies
yielded nonsignificant awareness scores and hence concluded
that participants lacked awareness of the crucial variable,
Vadillo et al. found a significant meta-analytic awareness ef-
fect (Cohen’s d = 0.16, 95 % CI [0.10, 0.22]) when they were
pooled, suggesting that participants’ learning in these experi-
ments was in fact conscious. Vadillo et al. (2016) also found
that the average power of these awareness tests was about 0.2.
Overreliance on null hypothesis significance testing (NHST)
can lead researchers to misinterpret null results from under-
powered awareness tests as false negatives.
If there are very few studies of unconscious cognition in
which above-chance performance is combined with
compelling evidence of chance-level scores on a high-
powered awareness test, then what other methodological ap-
proaches might provide evidence of unconscious cognition?
Some researchers compute performance–report correlations
(or the slope of the regression line) on the assumption that if
such correlations are close to zero, then it seems implausible
that awareness is causally associated with behavioral perfor-
mance. But once again, absence of evidence is not the same as
evidence of absence: A nonsignificant correlation coefficient
implies that there is insufficient evidence to reject the null
hypothesis (no association); it does not prove that the null
hypothesis is true (see Miller, 2000).
As an illustration, Conci and von Mühlenen (2011,
Experiment 2) estimated the correlation between the results
of an awareness test and a performance (priming) measure and
reported r = .14, p = .62. This lack of significant correlation
seems on the face of it to provide support for the claim that
learning was unconscious, but without knowing the confi-
dence interval on the correlation coefficient, it is impossible
to judge how much weight to place on such a null result. In
fact, the 95 % CI on the correlation coefficient has lower and
upper limits of -.42 and .62. Thus, the data are compatible with
a true correlation in excess of .6. Obviously, this estimation is
too imprecise to permit any strong conclusions to be drawn, a
problem that applies to many studies that rely on the same
strategy. A nonsignificant performance-report correlation
would only be theoretically relevant if the confidence interval
was narrow (the estimate was precise) and included zero. This,
in turn, requires high-powered tests, which are rarely under-
taken (Vadillo et al., 2016). Tests of stochastic independence,
once popular in research on implicit and explicit memory, fell
out of favor for similar reasons (see Poldrack, 1996).
Moreover, correlations or regression slopes close to zero
can be generated by models which assume that the perfor-
mance and report measures are based on a common underly-
ing latent process (Miller, 2000). A more sophisticated ap-
proach is to estimate the regression intercept, namely the level
of performance when awareness is zero (Greenwald, Klinger,
& Schuh, 1995). I return to this method briefly in the
Conclusions section.
Post hoc data selection
As the limitations of the methods described previously have
become clear, researchers have turned to other methods, in-
cluding post hoc data selection, the major focus of this article.
Post hoc selection has been in widespread use (as described in
a later section) since the earliest days of experimental psychol-
ogy (e.g., Lazarus &McCleary, 1951; Peirce & Jastrow, 1884;
Williams, 1938).
In this procedure, data from participants whose awareness
test score is below some cutoff are analyzed separately from
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the entire group. The cutoff can either be an appropriate base-
line score (typically zero on an awareness questionnaire or
50 % on a two-alternative forced-choice test) or could be
applied by a test of statistical significance. In the latter case,
an appropriate test is applied participant by participant, and
data are only included from those whose awareness score is
not significantly greater than zero.1 For simplicity it is as-
sumed in the following discussion that the former cutoff
(zero) is employed. For this subset of unaware participants,
their mean score on the performance measure is then calculat-
ed. If this score is reliably greater than an appropriate baseline
for that test, then it is concluded that true unconscious cogni-
tion has been demonstrated. In many studies, particularly
those assessing subliminal perception (see below), it is items
or trials rather than participants to which the awareness cutoff
is applied, but the rationale is the same. In these cases, items or
trials are selected post hoc for further analysis on the basis that
the participant reported no awareness of the stimulus.
The post hoc method, as defined here, must be distin-
guished from at least two other superficially similar methods
for evaluating bivariate X–Y data. A common analytic tech-
nique is to select individuals scoring at both extremes of Y—
say the top and bottom quartiles—and evaluate the X–Y rela-
tionship across these selected subgroups. Called extreme
groups analysis, this method has considerable value when
data collection is costly. For example, researchers might mea-
sure video-game playing across a large sample of individuals
by means of a questionnaire, and then administer a time-
consuming battery of cognitive ability tests only to those
reporting very high or very low hours per week spent playing
video games. As well as providing a wider discussion of some
of the issues raised by the extreme group approach, Preacher
et al. (2005) noted, in passing, another method that they
termed post hoc subgrouping. This refers to performing ex-
treme groups analysis—examining the X–Y relationship
across subgroups defined by high and low scores on
Y—even when X data have already been collected across the
full range of Y. The method under consideration here, post hoc
data selection, is similar to post hoc subgrouping except that
interest is focused on a subgroup at only one extreme of Y.
Evaluations show that the sacrifice of statistical power that
results from dropping data from the middle of the distribution
in the post hoc subgrouping method typically has minimal
compensating benefits, and accordingly Preacher et al.
(2005) were dismissive of the method. But post hoc data
selection is different in an important way: if the cutoff has a
theoretical rationale established a priori (e.g., a zero-point on
an awareness measurement scale), then the method may pro-
vide a useful tool for investigators wishing to divide a distri-
bution into qualitatively distinct components reflecting con-
scious and unconscious processing.
The logic of the post hoc data selectionmethod is simple and
intuitive, and this likely explains in part its growing usage in the
field. When one analyzes group data, there is always the chal-
lenge to prove that awareness is at chance. As noted above,
NHST is singularly unsuited to providing evidence for a null
effect. But if a subgroup of participants is selected precisely on
the basis that each of them scores at or below chance on the
awarenessmeasure, then it seems unarguable that this subgroup
lacks awareness of the relevant feature or variable. And if the
subgroup is then shown to perform significantly above chance
on the associated performance measure, then it seems equally
beyond dispute that true unconscious cognition has been doc-
umented. Researchers employing the method presume that
there are true individual differences in perception, cognition,
and learning such that, under the same conditions, one partic-
ipant becomes aware of a regularity whereas another one
doesn’t. The post hoc selection method identifies the “sweet
spot” conjunction between experimental conditions and indi-
vidual differences such that true unconscious performance is
revealed in the selected sample of participants.
A highly cited (>700 citations on Google Scholar,
June 2015) example of the use of the method illustrates its
intuitive appeal. Clark and Squire (1998) presented amnesic
and control participants with an eye-blink conditioning proce-
dure in which a tone (or white noise) conditioned stimulus (CS)
preceded an air puff to the eye (unconditioned stimulus, US)
and other trials in which the white noise (or a tone) occurred
without the US. The behavioral measure was differential con-
ditioned responding to the CS paired with the US in compari-
son to the CS presented alone. After the conditioning phase,
participants answered a questionnaire including 17 questions
about the temporal relationships between the CSs and the US.
Those scoring ≤12 items correct were classified as unaware of
the critical conditioning contingency. Clark and Squire (1998)
obtained reliable differential conditioning among the selected
subgroup of participants and interpreted this as evidence that
eye-blink conditioning can occur unconsciously.
Although never explicitly acknowledged by researchers
employing the method, it rests on a fundamental intrinsic as-
sumption. Performance and report measures, like all other
measures in psychology, are composed of some underlying
true score plus measurement error. When data from a group
of participants are collected, then all other things being equal,
the measurement errors cancel out and the aggregate mean
score approximates the mean true score. The post hoc data
selection method assumes that this same principle applies to
1 Employing a statistical test applied participant by participant introduces
a striking bias that can lead to spurious evidence for an unconscious
effect. Suppose that a subgroup of apparently unaware participants is
selected post hoc and is found to have a mean performance score signif-
icantly greater than zero. Even though each individual participant’s
awareness score might not be significantly greater than chance, it is the
mean awareness score from the entire subgroup that matters, and this may
well be significant. For example, Clark and Squire (1998) adopted such
an approach (see Lovibond & Shanks, 2002).
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the selected subgroup. As will be seen, a key testable predic-
tion follows from this assumption.
Themajor aim of this article is to show that the logic behind
the post hoc data selection method is flawed and that it does
not support the conclusions drawn from it. Indeed, because the
assumption above is false, it will be argued that the method
cannot be used to make inferences about unconscious cogni-
tion, or at least not in its uncorrected form. In a nutshell, the
problem is that the method must yield above-chance perfor-
mance scores in participants scoring at or below chance in the
awareness test, purely for statistical reasons. The key explan-
atory phenomenon that undermines the logic of the method is
regression to the mean.
In previous work (Berry, Shanks, Speekenbrink, & Henson,
2012; Shanks, 2005; Shanks & Berry, 2012; Shanks &
Perruchet, 2002; Shanks, Wilkinson, & Channon, 2003; Smyth
& Shanks, 2008; Vadillo et al., 2016), we criticized particular
uses of post hoc data selection and proposed that it cannot be
employed as a method for revealing evidence of unconscious
processing or of dissociations between unconscious and con-
scious processing. The grounds for those claims were that com-
putational models based on a single underlying variable were
able to reproduce the signature pattern obtained from the post
hoc selection method, and that it therefore could not follow that
demonstrations of above-chance performance in participants se-
lected as scoring at or below chance on an awareness test repre-
sent evidence for distinct conscious and unconscious processes.
Others (Zeelenberg, Plomp, & Raaijmakers, 2003; Sand &
Nilsson, 2016) have also highlighted flawed uses of the method.
Here, I develop a much broader and more detailed critique of the
method and provide recommendations for future research.
Post hoc data selection and regression to the mean
As an initial illustration of the problem, consider the data
shown in Fig. 1a. This scatterplot represents data from a
Monte Carlo simulation in which each point is a hypothetical
participant, and the x- and y-axes represent imaginary perfor-
mance and awareness measures, respectively, collected for
each of 200 participants (throughout this article, awareness
is plotted on the y-axis and performance on the x-axis). The
measures are moderately correlated, r = 0.28, and each yields
a mean score greater than zero, which is taken to be the level
of chance or baseline responding.
The X values have a mean of approximately X = 100,
which could reflect a priming score in ms, for example; the
Yvalues have a mean of about Y = 0.3 which could reflect an
explicit recognition d′ score, for instance. The exact nature of
the measurement scales is not essential to the line of reasoning
described below, which is general and also does not depend on
where the data points are located in relation to theoretically
motivated baseline or chance scores. It also does not depend
on the distributional properties of the data (such as whether
they are normally distributed), other than the correlation coef-
ficient (Samuels, 1991). The exact model which generated the
data will be described later.
In order to carry out a standard post hoc selection analysis
on these data, only those simulated participants whose Y
(awareness) score is less than or equal to zero are retained
for further analysis. What is the accompanying mean X
(performance) score for these participants, X |Y ≤ 0? It has a
value of 64, 95 % CI [43, 85], very substantially above zero
and not far below the group mean (which in this simulation is
101). This is the essence of post hoc data selection: It reveals
that (simulated) unaware participants on average have above-
chance performance scores.
The data in Fig. 1a manifest regression to the mean, but as
Campbell and Kenny (1999) noted in their classic monograph
on regression artifacts in behavioral research, a scatterplot is a
poor method of visualizing this phenomenon. Instead, they
built on pioneering work by Francis Galton to devise a much
better method for illustrating regression to the mean, theGalton
squeeze diagram. The first step in constructing such a diagram
is to replot the original data in z-score space, as in Fig. 1b. This
places the X and Y measures on a common scale and permits
them to be compared more directly. Next, the data are
partitioned according to their scores on the z(Y) dimension.
Here this is done by computing quartiles. Finally the mean
z(X) value for each quartile is calculated and the mean z(Y)
and z(X) for each quartile is plotted in a line graph as in Fig. 2a.
What this shows is that the 25% of data points from Fig. 1a
scoring highest on Y have a mean z(Y) score of 1.22, but these
data points are associated with much less extreme mean z(X)
score, about 0.33. At the same time, the 25 % of data points
scoring lowest on Y (mean z(Y) = -1.31) are also associated
with a much less extreme mean z(X) score, about -0.34. This is
regression to the mean: Values further away from z(Y) = 0 on
the left-hand axis regress toward the mean (z(X) = 0) on the
right-hand axis.
Regression to the mean is an intrinsic property of any bi-
variate data for which the correlation is less than 1.0
(Campbell & Kenny, 1999). In Fig. 1a, it is reflected by the
fact that data points which are extreme on Y (either high or
low) tend to be less extreme on X, and vice versa.2 When the
variables have the same mean and standard deviation (i.e., are
transformed into z scores), the magnitude of regression to the
mean is constrained by only one factor, namely, the correlation
coefficient. The predicted z(X) score for a data point
2 Note that statisticians (see Krause, 2009; Samuels, 1991) distinguish
between “reversion” and “regression” to the mean, and indeed Samuels
(1991) proposes that the term reversion to the mean should be used to
describe the property captured in Fig. 1a. I continue to use regression here
because it is a term more familiar to behavioural researchers, and
Samuels’ proposed usage is not universally accepted.
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measuring z(Y) is (see Campbell & Kenny, 1999; Cohen,
Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003, ch. 2)3:
z Xð Þ ¼ r z Yð Þ: ð1Þ
Thus, if the mean z(Y) of the bottom quartile of data points
(-1.3) and the correlation coefficient (0.28) are known, the
associated mean z(X) score can be predicted, in this case -
0.36. This is close to the value in Fig. 2a and only differs as
a consequence of sampling error. The smaller the correlation,
the greater the extent of regression to the mean. In the extreme
case where r = 0, the expected value of z(X) is zero—complete
regression to the mean.
3 In the linear regression model Y = a + bX, the slope b is given by b = r
σY/σX. If the variables are standardized so that σY = σX and the intercept a
= 0, it follows that z(Y) = r z(X). See Cohen et al. (2003, Ch. 2).
Fig. 1 a Scatterplot of data generated according to Eqs. 2 and 3. Y is assumed to be ameasure of awareness, andX ameasure of performance. b The same
data as in Panel A, but converted to z scores.
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In formal terms:
mean z Yð jY ≤cj Þ ‐mean z Yð Þ >j jmean z X jY ≤cð Þ ‐mean z Xð Þj;
where c is the relevant cutoff on Y. Because mean z(Y) = mean
z(X) = 0, it follows that
mean z Yð jY ≤cj Þ >j jmean z X jY ≤cð Þj:
Hence, “it is a mathematical necessity that whenever two
variables correlate less than perfectly, cases that are at one
extreme on one of the variables will, on the average, be less
extreme on the other” (Cohen et al., 2003, p. 36).
It is important not to be misled by the funnel shape of
Fig. 2a. The data points at the right are as dispersed as those
on the left (after all, the scatter of the points is what’s illus-
trated in the z-score graph in Fig. 1b). It’s simply that the
expected value of an extreme Y score regresses towards the
X mean. Moreover, a key feature of regression to the mean
is that it is bidirectional. Just as short fathers tend to have
taller sons, by the same token, short sons tend to have taller
fathers. Thus Fig. 2b shows that an exactly analogous fun-
nel pattern arises if it is the z(X) rather than z(Y) scores that
are the basis for the segregation into quartiles: the 25 % of
data points scoring lowest on the z(X) dimension have a
mean of -1.28 on that dimension but a mean of only -0.35
on the z(Y) dimension.
This latter illustration has a significant implication.
Researchers employing the post hoc method, and who believe
that performance can in some circumstances be more sensitive
than awareness (see Merikle & Reingold, 1991), might be
tempted to predict that it will be easier to select participants
post hoc who score above chance on the performance measure
and at (or below) chance on the awareness measure than the
converse. Yet the previous analysis shows that such a pattern
is unlikely to be observed. Just as participants performing
below a cutoff on the awareness measure Ymust have a mean
performance X score closer (in standard scores) to the group
average on X, so participants performing below a cutoff on the
performance measure X must have a mean Y awareness score
closer to the group average on Y.
What are the implications of these demonstrations of re-
gression to the mean for the post hoc data selection method?
The answer is simple: When two variables are imperfectly
correlated, then regardless of the underlying relationship be-
tween the latent variables they measure, it is a statistical cer-
tainty that applying an extreme cutoff on one dimension (such
as a measure of awareness) will yield a less extreme cutoff for
the expected value of the other variable (such as a measure of
performance). If the bottom quartile of data points on Y are
selected, and it is assumed that the subgroup this creates com-
prises unaware participants, then it is a statistical inevitability
that the subgroup’s expectedmean score onX, X |Y ≤ c, will be
closer (in standard scores) to the overall mean of X, X , than
their mean awareness Y |Y ≤ c is to the overall mean awareness
score Y . As Eq. 1 shows, it literally could not be otherwise, so
long as r < 1.0 (Campbell & Kenny, 1999). The only circum-
stances in which no regression occurs are when r = 1.0, but
this requires no measurement error, perfectly reliable mea-
sures, and a perfect correlation between the latent variables
measured by X and Y.
This analysis assumes that X and Y are on a common scale,
derived via a simple z transformation. Estimating regression to
the mean with raw scores can raise additional issues (Kenny,
2005), but because the transformation is reversible whatever is
true for z-transformed data is also true for raw scores. The two
analyses of published data presented later in this article are
conducted principally on raw scores and hence illustrate that
the issues highlighted here apply to the types of measures
typically collected in studies of unconscious cognition, even
when untransformed.
To illustrate regression in operation, Clark and Squire
(1998) employed post hoc selection to obtain evidence of
unaware eye-blink conditioning, as highlighted previously.
Regression to the mean is sufficient, in principle, to account
for this finding without any assumption having to be made
Fig. 2 Galton squeeze diagrams for the data in Fig. 1b. a mean z scores
for the bottom (Q1), second (Q2), third (Q3), and top (Q4) quartiles of the
Ymeasure plotted against the equivalent z scores for X. The funnel pattern
is regression to the mean. The equivalent analysis based on quartiles for
z(X) is shown in b and indicates the bi-directionality of regression to the
mean.
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about unconscious mental processes. Equation 1 establishes
that participants who were selected as being extreme on one
measure (awareness) must be less extreme on the other. If the
group mean conditioning score (X ) is greater than zero, then
the score for participants who were selected on the basis of
extreme scores on Y will regress toward this mean condition-
ing score.
Indeed, other aspects of Clark and Squire’s results pro-
vide further support for this account. The key
conditioning-without-awareness pattern was obtained in
only some of the conditions they tested. Specifically, par-
ticipants selected post hoc as unaware showed robust de-
lay eye-blink conditioning (in delay conditioning the CS
and US overlap temporally), but this pattern was not ob-
served when a trace conditioning procedure (in which the
CS and US do not overlap) was used. In the latter con-
dition, aware but not unaware participants showed condi-
tioning. Looking in detail at the conditioning–awareness
correlation in the different groups, this pattern follows
naturally. In delay conditioning, the conditioning–aware-
ness correlation was negligible (r ≈ 0), and hence from
Eq. 1, substantial regression is predicted and “unaware”
participants should show conditioning. In trace condition-
ing, in contrast, the conditioning–awareness correlation
was substantial (r ≈ 0.7), and hence little regression is
predicted. Consistent with the regression to the mean for-
mula (Eq. 1), evidence of conditioning in participants who
were selected post hoc as being unaware was obtained
precisely in those conditions where the X–Y correlation
was smallest. Admittedly, the regression account does not
explain why the conditioning–awareness correlations were
so different in the two cases, but then neither does Clark
and Squire’s theory, which is circular: The correlation is
low for delay conditioning because learning was uncon-
scious; but the post hoc method, in conjunction with the
low correlation, was guaranteed to identify apparently un-
conscious learning in delay conditioning.
An extreme way of highlighting the pitfalls of the post hoc
selection method is to consider the conclusions it would point
to when a measure of awareness is completely unreliable.
Imagine an awareness test that is equivalent to a coin toss.
The selection method would segregate participants into those
identified as “aware” and “unaware” by this test, and because
the X–Y correlation would necessarily be zero, there would be
complete regression to the mean on X. Hence, “unaware” par-
ticipants would appear to show significant performance (X),
but this, of course, would be a spurious conclusion.
This section has articulated the major point of this arti-
cle. In the remaining sections, the regression artifact is
further unpacked, generalized to a range of other situations
(e.g., binary awareness measures), applied and tested on
some real rather than simulated data sets, and placed in
historical context.
Why does regression to the mean occur?
As noted above, the post hoc selection method assumes that
the measured variables are composed of some underlying true
score plus error, and that when data from a selected subgroup
of participants are aggregated, the errors cancel out, and the
ensuing mean score approximates the mean true score. To see
why this assumption is false, it is necessary to describe the
model that generated the data in Fig. 1a. The model begins
with a random, normally distributed variable S with mean and
standard deviation (σS) equal to 1, and with S = 0 representing
the baseline of no knowledge. This common underlying var-
iable forms the basis of both the performance (X) and report
(Y) measures. Specifically:
X ¼ 100 S þ 30 eX ; ð2Þ
Y ¼ 0:30 S þ eY : ð3Þ
The variable S is first scaled by a factor of 100 in Eq. 1 and
combined with normally distributed random error eX, which
has a mean of zero and σ = 1, to yield that participant’s per-
formance score. This very same value of S is scaled by a factor
of 0.3 in Eq. 2 and combined with independent error eY (again,
with mean zero and σ = 1) to yield that participant’s awareness
score. It is therefore possible to ask whether or not the assump-
tion onwhich the post hoc selection method rests is correct. Of
course, for real behavioral data, this decomposition into true
and error components cannot be achieved, but because the
data in Fig. 1a were generated from a known model (Eqs. 2
and 3), such a decomposition can be done for these simulated
data (for a related simulation, see León & Suero, 2000). That
is, we can ask whether the Y scores for the bottom quartile
have a mean eYof (approximately) zero. Figure 3a depicts the
original 200 data points, but this time plotting the true value of
S against eY for each point. Overall the mean eY is close to zero
and the mean value of S is close to 1.0, as expected from the
model specification.
Contrary to the assumption that the measurement errors
have a mean of zero in the selected subgroup, the points
representing each quartile are not at all superimposed.
Instead, the points comprising the lowest Y quartile have eY
values consistently less than zero, whereas the points compris-
ing the highest quartile have eYvalues consistently greater than
zero. The large markers illustrate the mean for each quartile
and fall on a line sloping upwards to the right. Although it is
the case that points falling in the top quartile have larger true S
scores than those in the bottom quartile (the mean for the
former is higher than the mean for the latter), it is also the case
that the quartiles differ considerably in their mean eY values.
This arises because if a randomly chosen value of eY happens
to be large and negative, it is much more likely that the
resulting Y score from Eq. 3 (in which eY is one of the com-
ponents) will be negative than it would be if the value of eY
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were large and positive. The converse is the case if a randomly
chosen value of eY happens to be large and positive. Put dif-
ferently, although eY and S are necessarily uncorrelated, the
same is not true of eY and (0.30S + eY), which must be corre-
lated because they incorporate a common term. This correla-
tion means that high positive values of eY will be associated
with high positive values of the measured variable Y (=0.30S
+ eY), and similarly for large negative values. When eY is close
to zero, Y will tend to be too. Krause (2009) uses the term
captures to describe participants who—because of an extreme
amount of measurement error—are falsely selected for inclu-
sion in the extreme group.
The net effect is that the Y scores of participants selected
post hoc are systematically biased by error components which
on average are not zero. On average, the low awareness score
of a participant selected by the post hoc method is made up of a
Fig. 3 aBasis of the regression effect illustrated in Fig. 2. The scatterplot
represents the values of S and eY from Eq. 3 for the data points in Fig. 1a,
for the bottom (Q1), second (Q2), third (Q3), and top (Q4) quartiles of Y.
Large symbols are the means for each quartile. Although the overall mean
value of eY is zero, for the data points in Q1, the values of eY are
systematically less than zero, while for those in Q4 they are
systematically greater than zero. b The figure reproduces all the bottom
quartile Y data points from Fig. 1a, but decomposes them into their true
score and measurement error. The circles mark where each point would
lie if eY is set to zero. The red line extends to the observed Ywhen eY takes
its true value. Thus the tip of each red line lies at exactly the same value as
depicted in Fig. 1a. (Color figure online)
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“true” underlying score that is not particularly extreme (the
mean S values for the quartiles are not widely dispersed) and
an error component that is extreme (the mean eYvalues for the
quartiles are widely dispersed). When the true score S is then
combinedwith the error term eX (whichwill, on average, have a
mean of zero) in Eq. 3, regression to the mean must follow in
the resulting expected X score. Because eX and eY are uncorre-
lated, when an observation has an extreme value of eY, it is very
unlikely that eX will be equally extreme. Once again, I stress
that this is not an empirical speculation, but a statistical inevi-
tability. So long as measurement error is greater than zero, the
“true” expected level of awareness of a selected participant
must, on average, be greater than his or her measured score.
That it is error in Y scores (eY) that is crucial is confirmed by the
fact that the key regression patterns in Figs. 2 and 3 persist if eX
is fixed at zero, but are abolished if eY is zero.
Figure 3b depicts the biasing consequences of the post hoc
method in a particularly vivid manner. The figure reproduces
all the bottom quartile Y data points from Fig. 1a, but decom-
poses each into its true score and measurement error. The
unmarked tips of each red line lie at exactly the same values
as depicted in Fig. 1a (hence, if this figure were overlain on
Fig. 1a, the tip of each red line would fall exactly on top of a
data point in the figure). The circles mark where each point
would lie if there were no measurement error associated with
the data point, calculated by setting eY to zero. The red line
therefore extends to the observed Y when eY takes its true
value, and the lengths of the red lines represent exactly the
same set of eY values graphed for the equivalent (red) data
points in Fig. 3a. As Fig. 3b illustrates, the measurement errors
are far from random. Instead, they systematically transform
data values for which true Y > 0 into ones for which observed
Y < 0. Paradoxically, most of a sample of simulated partici-
pants, who all appear to lack any awareness whatsoever, ac-
tually have above-chance awareness. The true values of Y
show an upward slope as X increases, and this pattern mani-
fests itself because large values of X usually arise from large
values of S, which in turn yield large values of Y.
It bears emphasizing that the model cannot predict above-
chance performance in the true absence of awareness. To see
this, note that mean awareness Y in Eq. 3 can only be at chance
(zero) when S = 0. Because S is identical in Eqs. 2 and 3, then if
S = 0, X = 0 as well, and performance is predicted to be at
chance. This confirms that the key qualitative pattern that
emerges when data are selected post hoc cannot be proof of
true unconscious mental processes. In other words, this is a
demonstration that the canonical data pattern that the post hoc
method interprets as evidence of unconscious processes can
arise from a model in which no such processes exist.
When a researcher collects data from a group of partici-
pants, it is entirely reasonable (and indeed correct) to assume
that random measurement errors across participants will can-
cel each other out and that the aggregate measure for the group
approximates the true score. It also seems reasonable, but is in
fact fallacious, to assume that the same applies to a selected
subgroup. The very fact of selecting participants on a nonran-
dom basis immediately introduces bias in the errors for that
subgroup, as participants with extreme error values will be
overrepresented. This is impossible to demonstrate in real be-
havioral data where the generating model is unknown, but is
evident when the model is known, as in the simulation de-
scribed here.
The model analyzed above demonstrates that when disper-
sion in X–Y data is caused solely by measurement error (X and
Y would be perfectly correlated if eX and eY were zero), then
we can conceptually explain the ensuing regression to the
mean of Y on X via bias in the values of eY among the data
points selected post hoc. Measurement error is only one po-
tential cause of regression to the mean: Anything that contrib-
utes to an imperfect correlation induces it (Campbell &
Kenny, 1999, p. 30). Can the model be generalized to accom-
modate cases where X–Y dispersion is caused at least in part
by other, nonrandom factors? Imagine that participant i’s
scores on X and Yare attributable partly to a common variable




Y) that are unique to the
performance and report tests, respectively:
X ¼ SiC þ SiX þ eX ; ð4Þ
Y ¼ SiC þ SiY þ eY : ð5Þ
Each term could beweighted differentially (as in Eqs. 2 and
3), but these weights are omitted here for simplicity. This is a
more realistic model of report and performance which as-
sumes a factor common to both types of test as well as unique
factors. For instance, general attentiveness (SiC) might vary
across participants in such a way that highly attentive individ-
uals tend to score high on both types of test. At the same time,
“intuitive” individuals might score high on unconscious pro-
cessing (SiX) independently of conscious (S
i
Y) processing, and
“deliberative” individuals might score high on conscious pro-
cessing independently of unconscious processing. The sim-
pler model (Eqs. 2 and 3) is of course a special case of the
more complex model specified by Eqs. 4 and 5.
In this model, SiX and S
i
Y are independent, but constant
within participants and will therefore tend to weaken the cor-
relation between X and Y. With the error terms eX and eY
further weakening that correlation, the model encapsulated
in Eqs. 4 and 5 thus predicts robust regression to the mean,
of magnitude determined by Eq. 1. In the case where eX and eY
are zero, the ensuing regression would not, of course, be at-
tributable to the phenomenon illustrated in Fig. 3 (bias in eY),
but to a related effect: The independent distribution of SiX and
SiY means a below-chance-level score on Y selected post hoc
would be likely to incorporate a negative value of SiY. For such
a score, it is bias in SiY rather than in eY that would create
regression to the mean, and a result similar to that depicted
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in Fig. 3 would ensue, with SiY replacing eY. Although situa-
tions where eX and eY are zero are unlikely to have any mean-
ing within behavioral research, this example illustrates that
regression to the mean would still be a statistical inevitability
even if they were.
A further model variant is one in which there are genuinely
two distinct subpopulations of participants, one in which
awareness and performance are correlated and another in
which they are uncorrelated. Such a mixture model allows
us to ask whether the post hoc selection method has diagnostic
value when at least some participants truly do show an uncon-
scious performance effect. For instance, imagine that the per-
formance of some participants (True Aware) is determined by
a model similar to that of Eqs. 2 and 3, such that X = S + eX
and Y = 2 + S + eY, where eX, eY ~ N(0,1) and S ~ N(1,1). In
contrast, the performance of other participants (True
Unaware) is determined by a model in which X = S + eX and
Y = eY. Conscious (Y) and unconscious (X) measures will tend
to be correlated in True Aware participants because each de-
pends on the common variable S. But Y and X will be uncor-
related in True Unaware participants, for whom Y is simply a
random value drawn from a distribution with mean zero.
Figure 4 shows a resulting scatterplot for 200 simulated par-
ticipants, 100 from each subgroup. Clearly, the True Unaware
participants have on average no awareness (Y = 0), but above-
chance performance (X > 0).
If the post hoc selection method is applied to these data,
with a cutoff at Y = 0, we obtain, naturally, evidence of un-
conscious processing. In this case this would be a correct
inference because the data are derived from participants in
whom true latent knowledge S influences performance, but
not awareness. However, unless the distribution of Y scores
shows evidence of bimodality, the method can provide no
proof that the data come from such a mixture model. As the
examples described previously show, the same qualitative pat-
tern (X > 0 when Y = 0) can arise even when the underlying
model does not permit a distinction between conscious and
unconscious processes at the level of the latent processes. So
long as regression to the mean occurs, the pattern is inevitable.
And the only condition required for regression to the mean is
that X and Y are imperfectly correlated.
To summarize, in this section I have shown that regression
to the mean is a statistical inevitability whenever X and Y are
imperfectly correlated, and the magnitude of regression (in z
space) is determined solely by r. The reason it occurs is that
whatever is the source of between-participants variation (be it
measurement error or a nonrandom factor or both) will be
unevenly distributed across a subsample formed on the basis
of Y. As soon as one collects a sample post hoc on the basis of
a cutoff on the Yvariable, members of that sample will tend to
have biased values for the factor underlying that variation,
because members for whom the values are extreme are more
likely to meet the cutoff criterion. The bias will disappear in
the X measure due to regression to the mean. Even if the
sample includes truly unaware participants, the post hoc meth-
od provides no mechanism for proving as much.
Regression to the mean for binary measures
The analysis provided above assumes continuous measures
of conscious and unconscious processing. However, aware-
ness is frequently measured in a binary way. Many studies
on subliminal perception, for example, present participants
on each trial with a masked prime stimulus followed by a
Fig. 4 Scatterplot of data generated according to the mixture model described in the text. Y is assumed to be a measure of awareness and X a measure of
performance. Crosses represent simulated participants whose performance is truly conscious and circles ones whose performance is truly unconscious.
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target stimulus and measure responding to the target. Such
studies determine whether the prime exerts any influence
on the target response, compared to an unprimed baseline.
At the end of each trial the participant reports whether the
prime was seen (conscious) or unseen (unconscious). The
investigator then performs post hoc data selection at the
level of items rather than participants. That is to say, all
items for which participants made “unseen” reports are ag-
gregated and target responding is assessed for this subset of
items.
In this section I show that this method is undermined by
regression to the mean in an analogous way to that de-
scribed previously (for other criticisms of this technique,
see Schmidt, 2015). To demonstrate this I once again con-
struct a simple model. In this case, the latent variable S is a
random Bernoulli variable akin to a coin toss and with
values zero or one, each occurring with probability 0.5. S
can be thought of as the underlying true binary state of the
participant when a given prime stimulus is presented. Next,
it is assumed that the behavioral response X, which might,
for example, be a dependent measure in milliseconds, is
determined by
X ¼ 100 S þ 30 eX ; ð6Þ
where eX ~ N(0,1). From this it follows that X will have an
overall mean of zero (there will be no priming) when the
participant is in the true “unseen” state (S = 0), but will
have a mean of 100 (substantial priming) when she is in
the true “seen” state (S = 1).
The model assumes that the participant’s binary verbal
report (“seen”/”unseen”) depends on the same latent state
variable S:
Y ¼ 1 if S þ wYeY ≥ 0:5
0 if S þ wYeY < 0:5;

ð7Þ
where eY ~ N(0,1) and wY is a weight. Consider the case
first of all where wY is zero. Under these conditions a sim-
ple correspondence exists such that Y = S: measured aware-
ness is perfectly aligned with the underlying true state.
Next, consider the alternative case where wY = 1. If S = 0
and the amount of error eY is close to zero, Y will also be
zero. But on those trials when by chance eY is greater than
or equal to 0.5, Y will cross the 0.5 threshold and switch
from zero to one. Conversely, if S = 1 and eY is close to
zero, Y will also be 1, but on those trials where eY is less
than -0.5, Y will cross the 0.5 threshold and switch from
one to zero. The error term eY introduces trials where the
measured and true states Y and S diverge. The weight wY
serves to modulate the impact of error: the larger wY, the
more error trials there will be. As before, this model cannot
predict (subliminal) performance in the true absence of
awareness (S = 0). If S = 0, then X = 0 too.
Figure 5a presents results from this model across 200 sim-
ulated participants, plotting the mean level of priming (X )
obtained for different values of wY when post hoc selection
is applied. In the complete absence of error on Y, no priming is
obtained on “unseen” trials, while substantial priming (=100)
occurs on “seen” trials. AswY increases, so does the amount of
priming on unseen trials. Thus, simply as a consequence of
measurement error, the model generates an apparent but in
fact wholly artifactual subliminal priming effect. When the
contribution of error on Y becomes quite large, the degree of
priming on seen and unseen trials tends towards convergence.
In this example seen and unseen trials are assumed to be
equally frequent, but this may be an unrealistic assumption. In
many subliminal perception experiments the frequency of seen
trials is much lower than 50 %, presumably because the stimuli
are genuinely below or at least close to the awareness threshold.
In the experiments on brightness discrimination by Harris,
Schwarzkopf, Song, Bahrami, and Rees (2011), for instance,
the proportion of seen trials was only 12 %–26 % in different
conditions. Although this alters the precise quantitative behav-
ior of the model described in Eqs. 6 and 7, it does not alter its
qualitative predictions. Figure 5b shows the model’s output
when the probability of S having the value 1 is reduced from
50 % to 10 %. When wY = 0.6, for example, the percentage of
seen trials is 22 % (this is larger than 10 % because many trials
with S = 0 become seen trials as a result of the error component
of Eq. 7). Although the expected mean level of priming (X)
obtained for different values of wY is lower than in Fig. 5a, the
level again is greater than zero and increases with wY, yielding
substantial priming on unseen trials.
Regression to the mean is sufficient to induce apparent
unconscious priming in a model that does not permit true
unconscious effects at the level of the underlying latent psy-
chological state. It does so because of the asymmetry of “cap-
tures,” cases where as a result of measurement error true states
with S = 1 become unseen reports (Y = 0). Such cases regress
towards the mean on X, yielding substantial priming scores.
Only in the unrealistic case where measurement error is
completely absent does this effect attenuate completely.
Testing a key prediction of the regression account
If the low awareness scores of participants selected post hoc in
some sense reflect their true awareness, as researchers
employing the method assume, then a simple prediction can
be derived. Suppose such participants are tested a second time
on the awareness test. On this account their average awareness
scores should be similar to those in the first test. Their low
scores on Test 1 are assumed to reflect some true underlying
(non)awareness, plus random measurement error. On Test 2
the underlying awareness is the same, but combined with new
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and uncorrelated measurement error. Because the latter is un-
biased (has a mean of zero), the mean awareness of a group of
participants selected by this method should be the same on
Tests 1 and 2.
The regression account makes a strongly contrasting pre-
diction, namely that on Test 2 these participants will score
higher than on Test 1. Because the post hoc selection method
collects extreme data on the awareness measure, biased by
extreme eY error components, and because scores on two
awareness subtests will invariably be imperfectly correlated,
scores on Test 1 will regress to the mean on Test 2 (and vice
versa). Thus, the regression account makes a testable predic-
tion which is strongly at variance with an assumption of the
post hoc selection method.
To test this novel prediction, I reanalyzed data from a
contextual cuing study by Smyth and Shanks (2008,
Experiment 1). This experiment replicated and extended
an earlier one by Chun and Jiang (2003) that had employed
post hoc data selection among its analyses. Full details of
the procedure are reported in the original article and in the
main are not crucial here, but in brief the experiment com-
prised the following elements. Forty participants complet-
ed 24 blocks of a contextual cuing experiment, each com-
prising 24 visual search trials in which participants located
a target (the letter T inverted by 90°) among 11 distractors
(Ls). On locating the target, they pressed one of two re-
sponse keys as fast as possible to indicate its orientation.
The key manipulation is that some of the patterns of
Fig. 5 a Simulated results from the binary awareness model described in
Eqs. 6 and 7. Y is assumed to be a measure of awareness, and X a measure
of performance. Squares represent trials in which participants report
conscious experience of the stimulus (Seen), and circles represent trials
in which they report no conscious experience (Unseen). b Predictions of
the model when the probability of S = 1 is set to 0.1 rather than 0.5.
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distractors repeated during the experiment (once per block)
and for these patterns the target was always in the same
location (though its orientation was unpredictable).
Contextual cuing experiments ask whether participants
can learn about the predictiveness of repeating configura-
tions of objects, as indicated by faster RTs to repeating
compared to random (nonrepeating) displays. The RT dif-
ference for nonrepeating and repeating patterns was calcu-
lated for each participant across the final six blocks of the
experiment, and this is taken as each individual’s perfor-
mance score in the following discussion. Contextual cuing
is a reliable phenomenon, and 30/40 (75 %) of the partic-
ipants showed a numerical learning effect, M = 80.6 ms,
95 % CI [37.9, 123.2].
At the end of the contextual cuing stage, participants’
awareness was assessed via a generation test in which on each
trial a display was presented, in which the target T had been
replaced with another distractor L and the participant was
required (under no time pressure) to indicate which quadrant
of the screen contained this “hidden” target. The test therefore
asks participants to make nonverbal reports about the key
experimental variable.
The generation test comprised four blocks of trials each
comprising the 12 repeated configurations from the learning
stage and 12 random configurations. The latter are ignored in
the following analysis, which focuses on performance on the
repeated configurations. If contextual cuing yields pure un-
conscious knowledge then participants should be unable to
report the quadrant containing the hidden target (Chun &
Jiang, 2003). Because there are four quadrants, chance-level
proportion correct is .25. Each participant’s score combined
across Blocks 1 and 2 of the generation test (Test 1) and across
Blocks 3 and 4 (Test 2) was calculated. Figure 6a is a
scatterplot with the performance score (contextual cuing) on
the x-axis and Test 1 awareness on the y-axis.
The group’s performance on Test 1 was .31, 95 % CI
[.28, .35]. Consistent with the point made in the introduc-
tion, this level is significantly above chance. Group-level
assessments of awareness in implicit learning experiments
rarely yield scores truly at chance (Vadillo et al., 2016).
Thus, post hoc data selection may yield evidence for true
implicit learning, even though group performance does
not. Figure 6a indicates that 14/40 participants scored at
or below chance on the awareness test (Test 1) and hence
are selected for further analysis. These data are
reproduced in Fig. 6b (note that the axes have been ad-
justed to make visualization easier). These 14 participants
show a strong performance effect, M = 115.9 ms, 95 % CI
[40.7, 191.2], if anything, slightly greater than the mean
for the entire group. Thus, these participants, who appear
to completely lack awareness of the target’s location and
who perform no better than chance in the generation test,
nonetheless responded much faster to repeating than
random patterns in the earlier contextual cuing part of
the experiment.4
This pattern is therefore a clear replication of the post hoc
selection method that has been used in many other contextual
cuing experiments (e.g., Chun & Jiang, 2003). But is it evi-
dence for true unconscious knowledge, or is it simply an in-
evitable consequence of regression to the mean? We can ad-
dress this question in two different ways. First, we can ask
whether the observed degree of regression to the mean in the
selected participants’ mean priming score (X), given their
mean awareness score (Y), is in line with Eq. 1. From the X–
Y correlation (r = 0.10) and the awareness z score (-1.04), we
can calculate the expected priming z score if it were purely a
consequence of regression:
z Xð Þ ¼ r z Yð Þ ¼ 0:10 −1:04 ¼ −0:10:
This value falls inside the 95 % confidence interval of the
observed mean priming z score in the selected subgroup,M =
0.27, 95 % CI [-0.30, 0.83]. Thus, the observed level of prim-
ing in the unaware subgroup is consistent with regression to
the mean being the only causal process.
There is a second and even more compelling way of testing
the different predictions made by the two accounts, namely to
compare the selected participants’ scores on Tests 1 and 2.
Recall that the regression account predicts that extreme scores
on Test 1 will regress to the mean on Test 2. In Fig. 6b, each
participant is depicted by two data points, one (open circles)
showing their scores on Test 1 and the other (red crosses)
showing Test 2, with each point having the same performance
score (X value). The green and blue diamonds show the sub-
group’s mean scores for each test. It is clear that the regression
account is strongly supported: Most of the participants (9/14)
score better on Test 2 than Test 1, with only two showing the
opposite pattern (there were three ties). This improvement is
significant, M = .08, 95 % CI [0.02, 0.14], and provides no
support for the assumption on which the post hoc selection
method rests. The method construes the selected participants
as being truly unaware and therefore predicts that their low
report scores should be maintained from Test 1 to Test 2.
It is important to emphasize that regression is a nondirec-
tional process. Thus, data selected on the basis of extreme low
scores on Test 1 will regress toward the mean on Test 2, but by
the same token extreme low scores on Test 2 will regress
toward the mean on Test 1: The mean change for the latter is
about the same size, M = 0.10, 95 % CI [0.04, 0.15].
Moreover, the same applies to high scores. The regression
account predicts that participants with high awareness scores
4 Smyth and Shanks (2008) reported results of various post hoc selection
analyses across both participants and trials. Lest the reader conclude that
we were guilty of the analytic fallacy being highlighted in this article, it
should be pointed out that those analyses were only included at the re-
quest of a reviewer.
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on Test 1 will have lower scores on Test 2. This, again, holds
true: The mean awareness score of participants selected for
high scores (≥0.35) on Test 1 drops by -0.08 scale units,
95 % CI [-0.01, -0.15], on Test 2.
There is nothing special about this example or about the
relationship between performance and report. If the height of
all men in England is measured and a quantile, such as the
upper quartile, is formed, the estimate of their average height
will be biased upward. Measuring height is as imperfect as
measuring anything else. The upper quartile will contain a
disproportionate number of men for whom the measurement
error is positive, creating a bias inmeasuring their true heights.
To be concrete, the average height of men in England is about
175 cm (σ = 10). If a small amount of measurement error is
assumed (M = 0 cm, σ = 3), and height is normally distributed,
it is found (by simulation) that the average height of the upper
quartile is 188.3 cm. However the true mean height of these
men is a centimeter lower, 187.2 cm.5
5 Note that the latter is not an accurate estimate of the height of men in the
upper quartile of the population, but it is the average height of those men
whose measured height (including error) places them in the upper quar-
tile. This group will erroneously include some whose true height should
not put them in the quartile and exclude some men who should be in this
quartile but whose true height is underestimated as a result of measure-
ment error. The correct estimate of the true height of the upper quartile is
187.7 cm.
Fig. 6 a Data from Smyth and Shanks (2008, Experiment 1). Each point
represents a participant, plotting the magnitude of contextual cuing (X, the
mean priming effect in ms across the final six blocks of the experiment)
against awareness (Y, generation score, percentage correct in Test 1). b
Data are shown for the 14 participants in Panel Awho scored at or below
chance (25%). The open circles reproduce the data from Panel A, and the
red crosses show each participant’s score on Test 2. Diamond symbols
show the Test 1 and Test 2 means. The majority of generation scores
move upwards (become larger) from Test 1 to Test 2, reflecting
regression to the mean, and are no longer at or below chance. (Color
figure online)
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The reason for this (just as in the use of post hoc selection
in studies of unconscious cognition) is that the measurement
of height in this example is being used for two purposes: to
construct the subsample and to estimate the mean in the sub-
sample. If two independent height measures were taken for
these two purposes, then regression would be allowed to take
its natural course, and the estimate of height in the subsample
would be unbiased. This leads to the obvious recommendation
about future use of post hoc selection in research on uncon-
scious cognition: It must be based on two independent mea-
sures of awareness. I amplify this recommendation later.
The reliability of the awareness measure in the data de-
scribed above, calculated as the correlation across participants
between their awareness scores on Tests 1 and 2, is a mere
0.37. This means that the measurement error on Y, eY, is
substantial. The reliability estimate is low, but it is important
to highlight that other research has also obtained reliability
estimates far below 1.0 for tests of reportable knowledge.
For instance, Buchner and Wippich (2000) reported values
between and 0.41 and 0.88 for explicit recognition and recall
tests in memory experiments. The figures they obtained for
priming tests were even lower: 0.13–0.44 (see also LeBel &
Paunonen, 2011; Ward, Berry, & Shanks, 2013).
The prevalence of post hoc data selection in research
on unconscious cognition
In this section I briefly describe the extent to which themethod
described above has been employed in research on uncon-
scious cognition. This review highlights the fact that post
hoc selection has been in regular use for over a century to
address a broad range of specific questions about unconscious
processing. It would be impossible to systematically collect all
such studies (in part because no consistent name for the meth-
od is used) and because it is applied in so many different
contexts, but it is clear that dozens of studies have based their
conclusions in whole or part on this analytic technique.
The first use was by Peirce and Jastrow (1884), in one of
the most famous experiments from the early history of psy-
chology. In tests of pressure discrimination, Peirce and
Jastrow used an apparatus that allowed weights to induce dif-
ferent pressures on the finger. Two pressures were presented in
succession and followed by a judgment about which was
greater, and, finally, a confidence rating from 0–3, where 0
“denoted absence of any preference for one answer over its
opposite, so that it seemed nonsensical to answer at all,” and 3
“denoted as strong a confidence as one would have about such
sensations” (p. 77). Peirce and Jastrow found that very similar
pressures could be reliably discriminated better than pure
guessing, even on those occasions when a rating of zero was
made. An early use in vision was an analogous experiment by
Williams (1938), who presented one of three stimuli (a circle,
triangle, or square) at near-threshold intensity for participants
to identify at a distance of about 10 feet (~3 m). Each response
was accompanied by one of three reports: that the figure was
clearly seen, that something was seen, or that nothing was
seen. Williams observed that identification was reliably better
than chance, even for unseen stimuli.
It is instructive to consider these studies alongside those of
Sidis (1898). Although the research of Peirce and Jastrow
(1884) and Sidis (1898) is often discussed together, their
methods were—for present purposes—different in a crucial
respect. Sidis placed participants far enough away from a card
that they could not consciously make out the letter or number
printed on it. He reports that
“he saw nothing but a dim, blurred spot or dot. The
subject had to name some character which that particular
dot shown might possibly be. ‘It is nothing but mere
guess,’ commented the subjects” Sidis (1898, p. 170).
Nevertheless, the characters were identified with accuracy
much greater than would be expected by pure guessing.
Although the empirical conclusion is the same, Sidis’s find-
ings are not susceptible to a regression-to-the-mean artifact
because no selection was required: By removing the card to
a sufficient distance, Sidis ensured that all trials were uncon-
scious ones, not just those chosen post hoc on the basis of the
participant’s report.
In a famous and influential study, Lazarus and McCleary
(1951) first paired nonwords with a shock unconditioned stim-
ulus and subsequently observed reliable skin conductance re-
sponses when the nonwords were briefly presented, and even
on trials (selected post hoc) where the participant was unable
to report the stimulus. Many early examples are reviewed by
Dixon (1971), in the case of subliminal perception, and
Brewer (1974), in the case of Pavlovian and instrumental con-
ditioning. Brewer notes the existence of at least 31 experi-
ments published during the 1950s on just one particular topic,
which divided aware and unaware participants to study verbal
operant conditioning.
The studies described in Table 1, which include articles in
highly prestigious journals such as Science and Nature, high-
light the breadth of applications of the post hoc method. For
example, selection has been applied to participants and to
trials. It has been applied in primates (Supèr, Spekreijse, &
Lamme, 2001) as well as humans, with “reports” made non-
verbally. It has been employed in studies of social learning
(Heerey & Velani, 2010), language (Paciorek & Williams,
2015), and emotion processing (Sweeny, Grabowecky,
Suzuki, & Paller, 2009), as well as in the clinical domain
(Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995).
Trial-based selection has been applied not only when bina-
ry awareness measures have been made but also with finer
categorizations: in the study by Koivisto, Mäntylä, and
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Table 1 Examples of studies which have employed post hoc data selection at the level either of participants or trials/items, and their major conclusions.
Study Field Data selection Major finding
Clark and Squire (1998) Pavlovian conditioning Participants classified as unaware by
postconditioning verbal reports




Pavlovian conditioning Participants classified as unaware in a
concurrent expectancy test
Unconscious autonomic conditioning
Jones, Fazio, and Olson
(2009)
Pavlovian conditioning Participants classified as unaware by
postconditioning verbal reports




Sequence learning Participants classified as unaware by
postlearning verbal reports
Unconscious sequence learning
Sanchez, Gobel, and Reber
(2010)
Sequence learning Participants classified as unaware in
postlearning recognition and recall tests
Unconscious perceptual-motor sequence
learning
Weiermann and Meier (2012) Sequence learning Participants classified as unaware by
postlearning verbal reports
Unconscious sequence learning in young
adults, but not children or older adults
Batterink, Reber, Neville,
and Paller (2015)
Statistical learning Participants classified as unaware on a
recognition test
Unaware participants show statistical learning
Harris, Schwarzkopf, Song,
Bahrami, and Rees (2011)
Vision Trials on which participants reported no
awareness of visual stimulus
Brightness contrast for invisible stimuli
Mogg, Bradley, and Williams
(1995)
Vision Participants classified as unaware in a
prime discrimination test
Subliminal threat stimuli prioritized by
anxious but not depressed participants
Chun and Jiang (1998) Visual search Participants classified as unaware in
postlearning recognition and verbal
report tests
Unconscious contextual cuing of visual
search
Geyer, Shi, and Müller
(2010)
Visual search Contexts or participants classified as
unaware in a postlearning recognition
test
Unconscious contextual cuing and contextual
priming of visual search
Supèr et al. (2001) Primate vision Trials classified as “unseen” by saccadic
eye movement report
Late but not early processing suppressed for
unseen stimuli
Charles, King, and Dehaene
(2014)
Error detection Trials classified as unaware by subjective
report
Visual stimuli and responses, but not
accuracy, coded unconsciously










Van den Bussche (2013)
Consumer behavior Participants classified as unaware by
postpriming forced-choice test
Unconscious priming from brand logos
Ryan, Althoff, Whitlow,
and Cohen (2000)
Memory Trials on which conscious report of
relational manipulation failed
Eye movements reveal unconscious relational




Memory Trials on which conscious recognition
failed
Eye movements reveal unconscious relational
memory driven by hippocampal activity
Stark and McClelland
(2000)
Memory Old and new items judged new in a
recognition test
Unconscious repetition priming for
unrecognized words and nonwords
Duke, Fiacconi, and Köhler
(2014)
Memory Participants classified as unaware in a
prime discrimination test
Fluency and positive affect unconsciously
influence familiarity, but not recollection
Slotnick and Schacter
(2004)
False memory Old and related items judged new in a
recognition test









Rugg et al. (1998) Cognitive neuroscience Old and new items judged new in a
recognition test
Neural activity for misses, greater than for




Cognitive neuroscience Old and new items judged new in a
recognition test
Hippocampal activity for misses, equivalent to
that for hits, reflects unconscious memory
Koivisto, Mäntylä, and
Silvanto (2010)
Cognitive neuroscience Trials classified as unaware by
subjective report
Transcranial magnetic stimulation impairs
unconscious motion detection
Heerey and Velani (2010) Social cognition Participants classified as unaware by
postlearning forced-choice test
Unconscious learning of nonverbal social
cues
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Silvanto (2010), for instance, awareness of motion was
assessed by a 4-point scale where 1 = I did not perceive any
motion at all, 2 = I might have perceived motion, but I did not
have any idea of its direction, 3 = I did not actually see the
direction of the motion, but I may have been able to sense or
guess its direction, and 4 = I saw the direction of the motion. In
this case, post hoc analysis was confined to trials where a
rating of 1 was given.
In many subliminal perception experiments (such as those
of Koivisto et al., 2010), selection at the level of trials
depended on the individual report for that trial, and random
fluctuations in attention presumably determined the report and
hence whether the trial was selected. In other studies, selection
has been done at the level of items rather than trials. For
example, Geyer, Shi, and Müller (2010) used eight distinct
contexts (patterns of distractors in a visual search task) and
at the end of the experiment assessed participants’ awareness
of each context by a recognition test. They then applied post
hoc selection on a context-by-context basis to pool only those
contexts for which awareness, across participants, was
lacking.
This brief review provides an indication of the scale and
breadth of usage of the post hoc selection method. One other
noteworthy point is that none of these studies considered the
possibility that regression to the mean could come into play as
a result of using this analytic approach, despite the widespread
warnings in other domains within psychological research
(Campbell & Kenny, 1999). Of course, it is not being sug-
gested that all of the conclusions of all studies employing the
method are invalid. In many cases, the method contributes
only a small part of the evidence on which authors drew their
conclusions. But to the extent that conclusions do depend on
the method, they should be regarded as unsound.
Stated differently, it must be the case that for each of the
examples included in Table 1 there exists a model that makes
no distinction between conscious and unconscious processes
at the level of the latent processes, but that nonetheless can
predict the key qualitative pattern simply as a result of regres-
sion to the mean. Above-baseline indirect performance in par-
ticipants/items/trials classified as unconscious can arise sim-
ply for this reason, as the models described previously dem-
onstrate. Of course, whether suchmodels can explain the mag-
nitude of the key effect in each particular case, and the com-
plete response pattern observed, would have to be determined
on a case-by-case basis (the next section provides one exam-
ple). But unless it can be shown that the regression artifact is
insufficient, the results reported in these (and many other)
studies fall short of demonstrating unconscious mental
processing.
Subliminal reading and arithmetic
To this point, the conditions in which post hoc data selection
will cause regression artifacts have been characterized, a pre-
diction of the account has been tested and confirmed in the
data of Smyth and Shanks (2008), and the scale and breadth of
usage of the method in contemporary research on implicit
cognition has been reviewed. In this final major section, the
regression account is applied to a recent and high-profile case
in order to highlight how post hoc data selection can lead
researchers to draw unfounded conclusions.
Research using continuous flash suppression by Sklar et al.
(2012) appears to show that reading and doing arithmetic can
be achieved unconsciously. Sklar et al. reported nine experi-
ments using continuous flash suppression (CFS), in which a
stimulus presented to one eye can be rendered invisible by
flashing mask patterns presented simultaneously to the other
eye. CFS is an attractive technique compared to more tradi-
tional subliminal perception methods for studying uncon-
scious processing because very brief and precise stimulus tim-
ings are not required. In these experiments Sklar et al. present-
ed either linguistic statements or arithmetic expressions to the
suppressed eye and measured the time that it took the stimuli
to break suppression or their influence on related decisions. In
only three of these experiments, however, was an objective
awareness test employed, and hence I focus on one of these
(Experiment 6; the following analysis also extends to the other
two experiments). In this experiment the primes were arith-
metic strings, such as “9 - 3 - 4 =” and the target was the
correct (compatible: “2”) or an incorrect (incompatible: “3”)
digit. Sklar et al. reasoned that if participants took longer to
read the target aloud in the incompatible than in the compat-
ible trials, this would be evidence of information being ex-
tracted from the prime. They obtained such a priming effect,
though only with subtraction expressions.
In the subsequent objective awareness test, participants
were presented with the same prime stimuli, but now were
Table 1 (continued)
Study Field Data selection Major finding
Pessiglione et al. (2007) Motivation Participants classified as unaware by
a forced-choice test
Unconscious motivation of physical effort
Sweeny, Grabowecky, Suzuki,
and Paller (2009)
Emotion processing Participants classified as unaware by
postpriming forced-choice test
Unconscious affective priming can induce
long-lasting biases
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required to explicitly report whether the first digit in the ex-
pression was odd or even. Performing at chance (50 %) in this
forced-choice test would be evidence that no information
about the expression was consciously detected. Putting aside
issues such as task difficulty (Pratte & Rouder, 2009) and the
reliance on null hypothesis significance testing (Vadillo et al.,
2016) in the awareness check, I interpret it (as Sklar et al.,
2012, did) as a valid measure of prime awareness. The results
are shown in Fig. 7a (in line with Sklar et al.’s, 2012, analysis,
0.50 has been subtracted from the proportion correct so that
chance is now zero). The first and most notable feature of
these is the overwhelming tendency for participants to score
above chance in the awareness test (M = 0.15, 95 % CI [0.09,
0.21], d = 0.81). Indeed, 34/42 participants did so and hence
the majority of Sklar et al.’s participants were aware of the
primes. The priming effect, in contrast, is both small (M =
10.8 ms, 95 % CI [3.3, 18.3], d = 0.45) and less consistent,
with only 29/42 participants showing a numerical effect.
On what basis could Sklar et al. (2012) conclude that un-
conscious arithmetic calculations were taking place in this
experiment? They did so as a result of employing a post hoc
data selection analysis, eliminating participants who per-
formed above chance on the awareness test. Specifically, par-
ticipants (n = 25) were excluded either if their awareness score
was greater than chance by a binomial test (n = 21) or if they
explicitly reported awareness of the primes (n = 4). Thus, the
included participants in Fig. 7a scored significantly above
chance for priming (and +0.181 z scores from the mean prim-
ing score), but not for awareness (-0.785 z scores from the
mean score). This, of course, is regression to the mean, illus-
trated in Fig. 8a via a Galton squeeze diagram based on z-
transformed scores. From Eq. 1 and the X–Y correlation (r =
0.198), we can calculate the expected consequence of regres-
sion as 0.198 × -0.785 = -0.155, which is the expected priming
z score. This score falls (just) inside the 95 % CI of the ob-
served score, [-0.163, 0.525]. Thus the observed level of prim-
ing in the “unaware” subgroup is not sufficiently greater than
the level predicted purely by regression to the mean to rule out
the latter as the sole process in operation.6
Consistent with regression, the excluded (aware) partici-
pants show the exact converse pattern, a mean awareness
score well above the group mean and a mean priming score
much closer to the overall mean.When both measures (aware-
ness and priming) are above chance in the entire sample, the
selection procedure creates conditions in which the subsample
who meet the cutoff are more likely to score significantly
above chance in priming than they are in awareness. Sklar
et al.’s results are therefore not a scientific discovery, but a
statistical inevitability.
Two other points are worth noting. First, if we simply fo-
cused on the eight participants who scored at or below chance
on the awareness test (all the data points in Fig. 7a below the
x-axis, p > .05), reliable evidence of priming would not be
seen. Second, Sklar et al.’s exclusion criterion was skewed
in that it led to seven participants being included who scored
below chance for awareness, but 10 who scored above chance.
Luckily for Sklar et al., all 10 of the latter had nonnegative
priming scores. Ironically, the skew is even greater in Sklar
et al.’s Experiment 7, where of 30 participants included in the
analysis, only 7 scored below chance for awareness and 20
scored above. This is a significant skew (p < .01), indicating
that at least on this categorical measure, the sample supposed-
ly showing unconscious priming in fact performed slightly but
significantly above chance on the awareness test.
In sum, these results would arise even if prime awareness
were a necessary condition for priming. This point is now
reinforced via a simulation study of the key pattern Sklar
et al. (2012) obtained. I present a simple model of their data
based on two key components: (a) in contrast to Sklar et al.’s
conclusion, it assumes that priming and awareness depend on
a common underlying representation rather than on distinct
unconscious and conscious ones, and (b) it permits regression
to the mean to play its inevitable role.
Simulating priming and awareness in Sklar et al.’s
Experiment 6
Each participant is assumed to form some internal representa-
tion S of the suppressed stimuli presented in the experiment.
This representation is normally distributed with mean 1.0 and
standard deviation 0.5. This representation causes a priming
effect X for the participant, but the magnitude of this effect
depends on a noisy process:
X ¼ μX S þ eX : ð8Þ
In this equation, μX is a free parameter that scales the inter-
nal representation S, and eX is random noise added to the
process. The latter is assumed to have a mean of zero and
standard deviation of 24, while μX is set to a value of 18.
Scores on the forced-choice awareness (Y) test are modeled
in a similar way. The very same value of S for that stimulus is
taken, but added with an independent source of noise:
6 Sklar et al.’s (2012) Experiment 7 was similar to Experiment 6. Priming
in participants selected post hoc as unaware (N = 30) was 13.3 ms, 95 %
CI [1.8, 24.7]. This equates to 0.26 z scores, 95 % CI [-0.11, 0.63], above
the group mean priming score, while the subgroup’s awareness was -0.78
z scores below the mean score. From Eq. 1 and the X–Y correlation
(r = -0.18), the expected priming z score as a consequence of regression
alone is -0.18 × -0.78 = 0.14, which falls inside the 95 % CI of the
observed score. Thus, the results of both experiments are in line with
the regression account.
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Fig. 7 a Priming and forced-choice performance in Sklar et al.’s (2012)
Experiment 6. Each point represents one participant (n = 42). The x-axis
represents the facilitation (ms) for compatible compared to incompatible
target stimuli, and the y-axis represents forced-choice accuracy
(proportion correct – 0.5). Participants (n = 25) were excluded either if
their awareness score was greater than chance by a binomial test (n = 21)
or if they explicitly reported awareness of the primes (n = 4). b Simulation
of the results shown in Panel A. Data (n = 200) were generated according
to Eqs. 8 and 9. Open circles represent simulated participants included by
the post hoc method on the basis of Y scores less than or equal to 0.1.
Crosses are nonselected participants. Triangle symbols represent the
mean scores of the entire sample (black), the included (red) subsample,
and the excluded (blue) subsample. Themean X score (priming) is greater
than zero in all samples, including those scoring below chance on the
awareness measure. (Color figure online)
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Y ¼ μY S þ eY : ð9Þ
Here, μY scales S appropriately onto the awareness scale
and eY is a further source of noise, independent from eX. It is
assumed that eY has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of
0.04, while μY is set at 0.12. The precise values of these pa-
rameters are not crucial. They simply ensure that X and Y have
means and standard deviations fairly similar to those observed
in the experiment.
The critical point to note is that in this model, the ob-
served amount of priming and the accuracy of forced-
choice identification for a given participant depend on a
common latent variable for that participant, S. The only
difference is that this variable is scaled differently in the
two tasks and combined with independent sources of noise.
The model therefore assumes that there is no fundamental
difference between what the two tests are measuring: It
makes no assumption that the priming test measures some
form of unconscious knowledge that cannot be accessed by
the awareness test. Indeed, the model could not depart fur-
ther from Sklar et al.’s explanation of their data, as (like the
earlier models) it cannot predict priming in the true absence
of awareness. To see this, note that mean awareness Y in
Eq. 9 can only be at chance (zero) when mean S = 0. Since S
is identical in Eqs. 8 and 9, then if S = 0, X = 0 as well and
priming is predicted to be absent.
To simulate the experiment, 200 data points (participants)
were generated from the model, each comprising a priming
and an awareness measure. These were then segregated into
those for which awareness was at or below the cutoff (0.1,
based on the binomial test) and those for which it was above.
The results are plotted in Fig. 7b. Because of the parameter
settings, the generated data have similar means and standard
deviations on each measure to those observed in the experi-
ment. More important is that the mean priming for the simu-
lated participants whose awareness fell at or below the cutoff
was 10.9ms, 95%CI [5.8, 15.9], substantially above zero and
within the estimate of the priming level Sklar et al. observed in
their Experiment 6, M = 15.2, 95 % CI [6.9, 23.4]. Figure 8b
shows that the degree of regression in the simulation is very
similar to that observed in the experimental data.
Although the key finding (reliable priming in participants
classified as unaware) arises across a large portion of the pa-
rameter space, the particular parameter values chosen for the
simulation allow an additional constraint to be met. The
awareness measure Sklar et al. employed has relatively high
reliability, in the range 0.7–0.9 across Experiments 6 and 7 (A.
Sklar, A. Goldstein, & R. Hassin, personal communication,
February 9, 2016). The simulated awareness measure has
comparable reliability (r = 0.76), calculated by generating
two awareness scores Ywith independent values of eY for each
of 200 values of S and correlating the resulting Y’s. Thus, the
key finding does not depend on especially low reliability in
the awareness measure.
It is important to emphasize that the point is not to fit Sklar
et al.’s data precisely, which would in any case be of little
value given the small sample size of the experiment and en-
suing high variability. Rather, the point is to highlight that
regression to themeanmust be a factor and is indeed sufficient
to yield Sklar et al.’s key qualitative result, namely, above-
chance priming in participants selected post hoc as being un-
aware. Because the model in Eqs. 8 and 9 is incapable of
generating priming in the true absence of awareness, the pat-
tern generated in Fig. 7b—and by inference the qualitatively
identical one in Fig. 7a—must be due to something else. That
something else is regression to the mean.
The regression account can be thought of as a “null”
model, which assumes that awareness and performance
depend on a common source. In focusing on this null mod-
el, it is important to avoid inferring that all data that are
consistent with regression to the mean are uniquely sup-
portive of this theoretical position. Put differently, finding
that performance in unaware participants is approximately
in line with what one would expect from regression to the
mean does not automatically support the regression model
over an alternative unconscious processing hypothesis. As
always, data are only diagnostic between competing
models when they permit precise measurement, which in
Figure 8 Galton squeeze diagrams for the data in Fig. 7a (left panel) and b (right panel). Each diagram shows the mean z scores of the Y (awareness)
measure for the included and excluded participants plotted against the equivalent z scores for X (priming). The funnel pattern is regression to the mean.
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turn requires adequate sample sizes and careful experimen-
tal design.
In sum, the model predicts a priming effect in participants
whose awareness is near chance. It does this despite the fact
that it embodies no distinction between conscious and uncon-
scious processing. Crucial to the explanation is that the
model’s predictions incorporate regression to the mean. Data
selected on one dimension show regression in their scores on
the other dimension.
Relative ordering of means
A final observation about the regression analysis concerns its
predictions for the relative mean performance scores of aware
and unaware samples, versus the group mean. If z(Y|Y ≤ 0) and
z(Y|Y > 0) are the z-transformed awareness measures of un-
aware and aware subgroups, and z(Y) is the group mean, then
we know that these are ordered z(Y|Y > 0) > z(Y) > z(Y|Y ≤ 0).
That is, average awareness in the aware subgroup is greater
than the overall mean, while that in the unaware subgroup is
lower. From Eq. 1 it follows that z(X|Y > 0) > z(X) > z(X|Y ≤ 0)
if r > 0. Performance should be greatest in the aware subgroup
and lowest for the unaware subgroup, with the overall group
mean falling in between. This pattern is evident in Fig. 7b,
where performance is greatest for the aware (included) partic-
ipants and lowest for the unaware (excluded) ones. The pre-
dicted ordering is reversed for negative r.
Some of the empirical results analyzed in this article are
clearly at variance with this predicted ordering. For example,
in the reanalysis of the data from Smyth and Shanks (2008,
Experiment 1), contextual cuing was greater in the unaware
participants than the overall mean (116 vs. 81 ms). Likewise,
in Sklar et al.’s (2012) Experiment 6, mean priming was 15ms
in unaware participants, compared to an overall groupmean of
11 ms. In neither of these cases is the difference statistically
significant, but they do, nonetheless, violate the predicted or-
dering and must, if regression is the only process operating, be
attributed to sampling error. Future studies, employing suffi-
ciently large samples to permit high-powered tests of the rel-
ative ordering of performance scores in aware and unaware
subgroups, will be of considerable interest.
Conclusions
It has been appreciated for many years that regression to the
mean must be carefully taken into account when evaluating
interventions in clinical and educational psychology and else-
where (see Campbell & Kenny, 1999; Fiedler & Unkelbach,
2014). This article demonstrates that an entirely different field
within psychology, concerned with characterizing uncon-
scious mental processes, regularly uses an analytic technique
in which regression to the mean inevitably complicates the
inferences that can be drawn. Indeed once regression is con-
sidered, the results of many of these studies may turn out not
to require postulating distinct unconscious processes at all.
What recommendations can be made about future use of
post hoc selection in research on unconscious cognition? This
analysis points to an obvious suggestion: If it is to be used at
all, it should ideally be based on two independent measures of
awareness. If one measure is used to select the “unaware”
sample and the second to provide an independent estimate of
awareness in this sample, regression to the mean will tend to
eliminate bias in the second measure. This recommendation
should not be onerous to implement. It does not require two
completely different awareness tests; the odd and even trials
from a single test, for example, would be adequate. What one
therefore asks is whether a subgroup created by applying a
cutoff on Test 1 (a) shows a significant performance effect and
(b) continues to score at or below chance on Test 2.
Use of two independent awareness measures should be the
“gold standard”. But if only one awareness measure is avail-
able, then a simple test, as used above in the reanalyses of the
Smyth and Shanks (2008) and Sklar et al. (2012) datasets, is to
compare the observed performance measure in the “unaware”
sample against the score that would be predicted by regression
to the mean alone (i.e., Eq. 1). Thus, one can estimate the
magnitude of a performance effect X if it arose purely from
regression to the mean and compare this to the observed mag-
nitude. If the latter is substantially larger than the former, then
a true performance effect can be inferred. Of course, a high-
powered test is required if this comparison is to be diagnostic:
In the analyses reported above, the confidence intervals on the
performance scores were very wide. Other methods are also
available but are less satisfactory because they rely on as-
sumptions that may be difficult to validate. For instance,
methods for statistically correcting for regression to the mean
have been developed (see Hsu, 1995, for discussion).
Better still is to avoid use of post hoc selection entirely. One
approach is to employ experimental manipulations to ensure
that the entire group is unaware, or on a participant-by-
participant basis. For example, in an implicit learning experi-
ment, the length of the training phase could be titrated to
ensure that group-level awareness is not significantly greater
than chance. Under such circumstances no post hoc selection
is required. Of course, care must be taken to ensure that scores
on the awareness test really are very close to chance: A large
sample is likely to be required to ensure narrow confidence
intervals, or a clear Bayes factor favoring the null, on the
awareness measure (Dienes, 2015; Vadillo et al., 2016).
With this in mind, it is clear how Sklar et al. (2012) could
obtain stronger evidence for unconscious arithmetic. In their
experiments, the prime stimulus was presented in continuous
flash suppression for 1,700 or 2,000 ms and, as noted previ-
ously, participants performed as a group significantly better
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than chance in the forced-choice awareness test. Thus, one
strategy would be to reduce the prime presentation time for
all participants to try to find an exposure duration at which a
group-level priming effect could still be detected, but with
chance-level awareness. Under such conditions, no post hoc
selection would be required.
It is interesting to note that, at least in the field of subliminal
perception, participant-by-participant stimulus calibration was
once the norm (see Holender, 1986). Researchers routinely
employed staircase methods in which the duration of a prime
stimulus was increased and decreased in order for each partic-
ipant’s awareness threshold to be determined. Then, in the
main subliminal perception task, the stimulus was presented
below each participant’s threshold. Under these circum-
stances, no post hoc selection is required, and any group-
level priming can legitimately be taken as evidence for uncon-
scious processing. Gradually, however, this practice dwindled,
perhaps because it is time-consuming to determine each par-
ticipant’s individual threshold, and was replaced by group-
level subjective and objective tests and, in some cases, post
hoc data selection. Thus, another way in which researchers
such as Sklar et al. (2012) could obtain stronger evidence is
to determine each participant’s awareness threshold
individually, and ask whether priming occurs when stimuli
are presented below threshold.
Preacher et al. (2005) cautioned “that the conclusions that can
be based on the results of EGA [extreme groups analysis], al-
though sometimes useful, are limited relative to those based on
analysis of full-range, continuous data” (p. 190). Given the con-
cerns identified in this article, it is reasonable to ask whether
traditional regression techniques applied to the entireX–Y dataset
might answer the key questions researchers are interested in
concerning unconscious processing, without all the problems
associated with regression to the mean. Rather than excluding
data, analytic techniques can be employed that retain all data and
adopt different logic to estimate unconscious processing.
An example is the development by Greenwald et al. (1995)
of a regressionmethod that tests for the value of theX intercept
when Y = 0. If this intercept is positive, then it seems reason-
able to infer that performance must be driven at least in part by
unconscious information. Greenwald and colleagues found
evidence of subliminal perception by this method in a large
study including 1,431 participants. Unfortunately even this
technique is not immune to problems of measurement error
and regression to the mean. Miller (2000; see also Dosher,
1998; Sand & Nilsson, 2016) conducted a series of simula-
tions and concluded that measurement error systematically
biases the estimation of the intercept upward, such that it ap-
pears positive when it should truly be zero. The present critical
appraisal of the post hoc method parallels Miller’s (2000)
equivalent appraisal of the regression method.
Alternatively, instead of focusing solely on examining the
relationship between manifest variables assumed to accurately
measure different forms (conscious and unconscious) of men-
tal processing, a much more powerful approach is to measure
the relationships between the latent variables assumed to un-
derlie these manifest variables, using well-established tech-
niques such as structural equation modeling or confirmatory
factor analysis. Some examples of this approach show that it
has considerable promise (Kaufman et al., 2010; Rünger,
Nagy, & Frensch, 2009; Salthouse, McGuthry, & Hambrick,
1999; Woltz & Shute, 1993).
Acknowledgments Programs for running all the simulations reported
in this article are available in both Excel and MATLAB versions
(https://osf.io/6h2qj/). All statistical analyses were computed in JASP
(Love et al., 2015). I am indebted to Ran Hassin for kindly providing
the data from Experiments 6 and 7 in Sklar et al. (2012), and to Ben
Newell, Chris Berry, Zoltan Dienes, Peter Lovibond, Sam
Schwarzkopf, Maarten Speekenbrink, Miguel Vadillo, and Andy Wills
for helpful advice and comments.
Compliance with ethical standards
Conflict of interest The author declares no conflict of interest.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons At t r ibut ion 4 .0 In te rna t ional License (h t tp : / /
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appro-
priate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Batterink, L. J., Reber, P. J., Neville, H. J., & Paller, K. A. (2015). Implicit
and explicit contributions to statistical learning. Journal of Memory
and Language, 83, 62–78. doi:10.1016/j.jml.2015.04.004
Berry, C. J., Shanks, D. R., Li, S., Rains, L. S., & Henson, R. N. A. (2010).
Can “pure” implicit memory be isolated? A test of a single-system
model of recognition and repetition priming. Canadian Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 64, 241–255. doi:10.1037/a0021525
Berry, C. J., Shanks, D. R., Speekenbrink, M., & Henson, R. N. A.
(2012). Models of recognition, repetition priming, and fluency:
Exploring a new framework. Psychological Review, 119, 40–79.
doi:10.1037/a0025464
Brewer, W. F. (1974). There is no convincing evidence for operant or
classical conditioning in adult humans. In W. B. Weimer & D. S.
Palermo (Eds.), Cognition and the symbolic processes (pp. 1–42).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Buchner, A., & Wippich, W. (2000). On the reliability of implicit and
explicit memory measures. Cognitive Psychology, 40, 227–259.
doi:10.1006/cogp.1999.0731
Butler, B. C., &Klein, R. (2009). Inattentional blindness for ignored words:
Comparison of explicit and implicit memory tasks. Consciousness
and Cognition, 18, 811–819. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2009.02.009
Campbell, D. T., &Kenny, D. A. (1999). A primer on regression artifacts.
New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Charles, L., King, J.-R., &Dehaene, S. (2014). Decoding the dynamics of
action, intention, and error detection for conscious and subliminal
stimuli. Journal of Neuroscience, 34, 1158–1170. doi:10.1523/
jneurosci.2465-13.2014
Psychon Bull Rev
Chun, M. M., & Jiang, Y. (1998). Contextual cueing: Implicit learning
and memory of visual context guides spatial attention. Cognitive
Psychology, 36, 28–71. doi:10.1006/cogp.1998.0681
Chun, M. M., & Jiang, Y. (2003). Implicit, long-term spatial contextual
memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition, 29, 224–234. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.29.2.224
Clark, R. E., & Squire, L. R. (1998). Classical conditioning and brain
systems: The role of awareness. Science, 280, 77–81. doi:10.1126/
science.280.5360.77
Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. (2003). Applied multiple
regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences (3rd ed.).
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Conci, M., & von Mühlenen, A. (2011). Limitations of perceptual seg-
mentation on contextual cueing in visual search. Visual Cognition,
19, 203–233. doi:10.1080/13506285.2010.518574
Daselaar, S. M., Fleck, M. S., Prince, S. E., & Cabeza, R. (2006). The
medial temporal lobe distinguishes old from new independently of
consciousness. Journal of Neuroscience, 26, 5835–5839.
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0258-06.2006
Dienes, Z. (2015). How Bayesian statistics are needed to determine
whether mental states are unconscious. In M. Overgaard (Ed.),
Behavioural methods in consciousness research (pp. 199–220).
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Dixon, N. F. (1971). Subliminal perception: The nature of a controversy.
London, UK: McGraw-Hill.
Dosher, B. A. (1998). The response-window regression method—Some
problematic assumptions: Comment on Draine and Greenwald
(1998). Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 127, 311–
317. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.127.3.311
Duke, D., Fiacconi, C. M., & Köhler, S. (2014). Parallel effects of pro-
cessing fluency and positive affect on familiarity-based recognition
decisions for faces. Frontiers in Psychology, 5. doi:10.3389/
fpsyg.2014.00328
Dulany, D. E. (1961). Hypotheses and habits in verbal “operant condi-
tioning”. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63, 251–263.
doi:10.1037/h0047703
Fiedler, K., & Unkelbach, C. (2014). Regressive judgment: Implications of a
universal property of the empirical world. Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 23, 361–367. doi:10.1177/0963721414546330
Geyer, T., Shi, Z. H., & Müller, H. J. (2010). Contextual cueing in
multiconjunction visual search is dependent on color- and
configuration-based intertrial contingencies. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance,
36, 515–532. doi:10.1037/a0017448
Greenspoon, J. (1955). The reinforcing effect of two spoken sounds on
the frequency of two responses. American Journal of Psychology,
68, 409–416. doi:10.2307/1418524
Greenwald, A. G., Klinger, M. R., & Schuh, E. S. (1995). Activation by
marginally perceptible (“subliminal”) stimuli: Dissociations of un-
conscious from conscious cognition. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 124, 22–42. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.124.1.22
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998).
Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit
association test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74,
1464–1480. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.6.1464
Hannula, D. E., & Ranganath, C. (2009). The eyes have it: Hippocampal
activity predicts expression of memory in eye movements. Neuron,
63, 592–599. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2009.08.025
Harris, J. J., Schwarzkopf, D. S., Song, C., Bahrami, B., & Rees, G.
(2011). Contextual illusions reveal the limit of unconscious visual
processing. Psychological Science, 22, 399–405. doi:10.1177
/0956797611399293
Heerey, E. A., &Velani, H. (2010). Implicit learning of social predictions.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 577–581.
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2010.01.003
Holender, D. (1986). Semantic activationwithout conscious identification
in dichotic listening, parafoveal vision, and visual masking: A sur-
vey and appraisal. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 1–66.
doi:10.1017/S0140525X00021269
Hsu, L. M. (1995). Regression toward the mean associated with measure-
ment error and the identification of improvement and deterioration
in psychotherapy. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology,
63, 141–144. doi:10.1037/0022-006X.63.1.141
Jensen, K., Kirsch, I., Odmalm, S., Kaptchuk, T. J., & Ingvar, M. (2015).
Classical conditioning of analgesic and hyperalgesic pain responses
without conscious awareness. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences, 112, 7863–7867. doi:10.1073/pnas.1504567112
Jones, C. R., Fazio, R. H., &Olson,M. A. (2009). Implicit misattribution as a
mechanism underlying evaluative conditioning. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 96, 933–948. doi:10.1037/a0014747
Kaufman, S. B., DeYoung, C. G., Gray, J. R., Jiménez, L., Brown, J., &
Mackintosh, N. (2010). Implicit learning as an ability. Cognition,
116, 321–340. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2010.05.011
Kenny, D. A. (2005). Regression artifacts. In B. S. Everitt &D. C. Howell
(Eds.), Encyclopedia of statistics in behavioral science (pp. 1723–
1725). Chichester, UK: Wiley.
Koivisto, M., Mäntylä, T., & Silvanto, J. (2010). The role of early visual
cortex (V1/V2) in conscious and unconscious visual perception.
NeuroImage, 51, 828–834. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.02.042
Krause, M. S. (2009). Reversion toward the mean independently of re-
gression toward the mean. Methodology: European Journal of
Research Methods for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 5, 3–6.
doi:10.1027/1614-2241.5.1.3
Lazarus, R. S., & McCleary, R. A. (1951). Autonomic discrimination
without awareness: A study of subception. Psychological Review,
58, 113–122. doi:10.1037/h0054104
LeBel, E. P., & Paunonen, S. V. (2011). Sexy but often unreliable: The
impact of unreliability on the replicability of experimental findings
with implicit measures. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
37, 570–583. doi:10.1177/0146167211400619
León, O. G., & Suero, M. (2000). Regression toward the mean associated
with extreme groups and the evaluation of improvement.
Psicothema, 12, 145–149.
Love, J., Selker, R., Marsman, M., Jamil, T., Verhagen, A. J., Ly, A., …
Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2015). JASP (Version 0.6.5) [Computer soft-
ware]. Available at https://jasp-stats.org/
Lovibond, P. F., & Shanks, D. R. (2002). The role of awareness in
Pavlovian conditioning: Empirical evidence and theoretical implica-
tions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior
Processes, 28, 3–26. doi:10.1037//0097-7403.28.1.3
Merikle, P. M., & Reingold, E. M. (1991). Comparing direct (explicit)
and indirect (implicit) measures to study unconscious memory.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 17, 224–233. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.17.2.224
Miller, J. (2000). Measurement error in subliminal perception experi-
ments: Simulation analyses of two regression methods. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance,
26, 1461–1477. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.26.4.1461
Mogg, K., Bradley, B. P., &Williams, R. (1995). Attentional bias in anxiety
and depression: The role of awareness. British Journal of Clinical
Psychology, 34, 17–36. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8260.1995.tb01434.x
Muscarella, C., Brintazzoli, G., Gordts, S., Soetens, E., & Van den
Bussche, E. (2013). Short- and long-term effects of conscious, min-
imally conscious and unconscious brand logos. PLoS ONE, 8,
e57738. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057738
Newell, B. R., & Shanks, D. R. (2014). Unconscious influences on deci-
sion making: A critical review. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 37,
1–19. doi:10.1017/S0140525X12003214
Paciorek, A., & Williams, J. N. (2015). Semantic generalization in implicit
language learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 41, 989–1002. doi:10.1037/xlm0000100
Psychon Bull Rev
Peirce, C. S., & Jastrow, J. (1884). On small differences of sensation.
Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences, 3, 75–83.
Pessiglione, M., Schmidt, L., Draganski, B., Kalisch, R., Lau, H., Dolan,
R. J., & Frith, C. D. (2007). How the brain translates money into
force: A neuroimaging study of subliminal motivation. Science, 316,
904–906. doi:10.1126/science.1140459
Poldrack, R. A. (1996). On testing for stochastic dissociations. Psychonomic
Bulletin & Review, 3, 434–448. doi:10.3758/BF03214547
Pratte, M. S., & Rouder, J. N. (2009). A task-difficulty artifact in sublim-
inal priming. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 71, 1276–
1283. doi:10.3758/APP.71.6.1276
Preacher, K. J., Rucker, D. D., MacCallum, R. C., & Nicewander, W. A.
(2005). Use of the extreme groups approach: A critical reexamina-
tion and new recommendations. Psychological Methods, 10, 178–
192. doi:10.1037/1082-989X.10.2.178
Reingold, E. M., & Merikle, P. M. (1988). Using direct and indirect
measures to study perception without awareness. Perception &
Psychophysics, 44, 563–575. doi:10.3758/BF03207490
Rugg, M. D., Mark, R. E., Walla, P., Schloerscheidt, A. M., Birch, C. S.,
& Allan, K. (1998). Dissociation of the neural correlates of implicit
and explicit memory. Nature, 392, 595–598. doi:10.1038/33396
Rünger, D., Nagy, G., & Frensch, P. A. (2009). Do recognition and prim-
ing index a unitary knowledge base? Comment on Shanks et al.
(2003). Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition, 35, 572–585. doi:10.1037/a0014543
Ryan, J. D., Althoff, R. R., Whitlow, S., & Cohen, N. J. (2000). Amnesia
is a deficit in relational memory. Psychological Science, 11, 454–
461. doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00288
Salthouse, T. A., McGuthry, K. E., & Hambrick, D. Z. (1999). A framework
for analyzing and interpreting differential aging patterns: Application to
three measures of implicit learning. Aging, Neuropsychology, and
Cognition, 6, 1–18. doi:10.1076/anec.6.1.1.789
Samuels, M. L. (1991). Statistical reversion toward the mean: More uni-
versal than regression toward the mean. American Statistician, 45,
344–346. doi:10.2307/2684474
Sanchez, D. J., Gobel, E. W., & Reber, P. J. (2010). Performing the
unexplainable: Implicit task performance reveals individually reli-
able sequence learning without explicit knowledge. Psychonomic
Bulletin & Review, 17, 790–796. doi:10.3758/pbr.17.6.790
Sand, A., & Nilsson, M. E. (2016). Subliminal or not? Comparing null-
hypothesis and Bayesian methods for testing subliminal priming.
Consciousness and Cognition, 44, 29–40. doi:10.1016/j.
concog.2016.06.012
Schmidt, T. (2015). Invisible stimuli, implicit thresholds: Why invisibility
judgments cannot be interpreted in isolation. Advances in Cognitive
Psychology, 11, 31–41. doi:10.5709/acp-0169-3
Schmidt, T., & Vorberg, D. (2006). Criteria for unconscious cognition:
Three types of dissociation. Perception & Psychophysics, 68, 489–
504. doi:10.3758/bf03193692
Schultz, D. H., & Helmstetter, F. J. (2010). Classical conditioning of
autonomic fear responses is independent of contingency awareness.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes,
36, 495–500. doi:10.1037/a0020263
Shanks, D. R. (2005). Implicit learning. In K. Lamberts & R. L. Goldstone
(Eds.), Handbook of cognition (pp. 202–220). London, UK: Sage.
Shanks, D. R., &Berry, C. J. (2012). Are theremultiplememory systems?
Tests of models of implicit and explicit memory. Quarterly Journal
of Experimental Psychology, 65, 1449–1474. doi:10.1080/
17470218.2012.691887
Shanks, D. R., & Perruchet, P. (2002). Dissociation between priming and
recognition in the expression of sequential knowledge.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9, 362–367. doi:10.3758
/bf03196294
Shanks, D. R., & St. John, M. F. (1994). Characteristics of dissociable
human learning systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17, 367–
395. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00035032
Shanks, D. R., Wilkinson, L., & Channon, S. (2003). Relationship be-
tween priming and recognition in deterministic and probabilistic
sequence learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 29, 248–261. doi:10.1037/0278-
7393.29.2.248
Sidis, B. (1898). The psychology of suggestion: A research into the sub-
conscious nature of man and society. New York, NY: Appleton.
Sklar, A. Y., Levy, N., Goldstein, A., Mandel, R., Maril, A., & Hassin, R.
R. (2012). Reading and doing arithmetic nonconsciously.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109, 19614–
19619. doi:10.1073/pnas.1211645109
Slotnick, S. D., & Schacter, D. L. (2004). A sensory signature that dis-
tinguishes true from false memories. Nature Neuroscience, 7, 664–
672. doi:10.1038/nn1252
Smyth, A. C., & Shanks, D. R. (2008). Awareness in contextual cuing
with extended and concurrent explicit tests. Memory & Cognition,
36, 403–415. doi:10.3758/mc.36.2.403
Stark, C. E. L., & McClelland, J. L. (2000). Repetition priming of words,
pseudowords, and nonwords. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26, 945–972. doi:10.1037/0278-
7393.26.4.945
Supèr, H., Spekreijse, H., & Lamme, V. A. F. (2001). Two distinct modes
of sensory processing observed in monkey primary visual cortex
(V1). Nature Neuroscience, 4, 304–310. doi:10.1038/85170
Sweeny, T. D., Grabowecky, M., Suzuki, S., & Paller, K. A. (2009).
Long-lasting effects of subliminal affective priming from facial ex-
pressions.Consciousness and Cognition, 18, 929–938. doi:10.1016/
j.concog.2009.07.011
ten Brinke, L., Stimson, D., & Carney, D. R. (2014). Some evidence for
unconscious lie detection. Psychological Science, 25, 1098–1105.
doi:10.1177/0956797614524421
Vadillo, M. A., Konstantinidis, E., & Shanks, D. R. (2016).
Underpowered samples, false negatives, and unconscious learning.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23(1), 87–102. doi:10.3758/
s13423-015-0892-6
Vuilleumier, P., Schwartz, S., Duhoux, S., Dolan, R. J., & Driver, J.
(2005). Selective attention modulates neural substrates of repetition
printing and “implicit” visual memory: Suppressions and enhance-
ments revealed by fMRI. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 17,
1245–1260. doi:10.1162/0898929055002409
Ward, E. V., Berry, C. J., & Shanks, D. R. (2013). An effect of age on
implicit memory that is not due to explicit contamination:
Implications for single and multiple-systems theories. Psychology
and Aging, 28(2), 429–442. doi:10.1037/a0031888
Weiermann, B., & Meier, B. (2012). Incidental sequence learning across
the lifespan. Cognition, 123, 380–391. doi:10.1016/j.
cognition.2012.02.010
Weiskrantz, L. (1986). Blindsight: A case study and implications. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press.
Williams, A. C. (1938). Perception of subliminal visual stimuli. Journal
of Psychology, 6, 187–199. doi:10.1080/00223980.1938.9917596
Willingham, D. B., Nissen, M. J., & Bullemer, P. (1989). On the devel-
opment of procedural knowledge. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 15, 1047–1060.
doi:10.1037/0278-7393.15.6.1047
Woltz, D. J., & Shute, V. J. (1993). Individual difference in repetition
priming and its relationship to declarative knowledge acquisition.
Intelligence, 17, 333–359. doi:10.1016/0160-2896(93)90004-O
Zeelenberg, R., Plomp, G., & Raaijmakers, J. G.W. (2003). Can false mem-
ories be created through nonconscious processes? Consciousness and
Cognition, 12, 403–412. doi:10.1016/s1053-8100(03)00021-7
Psychon Bull Rev
